Hardware Trojan: Australia under threat?
Kanish Oberoi
In 2012, the Australian Federal Government placed significant pressure on relations with Beijing as it prevented the Chinese telecommunications giant, Huawei, from tendering for the National Broadband Network (NBN). Due to the apparent intimate relationship between Huawei and the People's Liberation Army (PLA), fears were raised over the potential for hardware backdoor capabilities in the NBN to facilitate China’s growing cyber espionage. Prime Minister Julia Gillard stated, "The National Broadband Network is a piece of critical infrastructure, it is the future of our nation's telecommunications. You would expect that as a government we would make the appropriate decisions to protect that critical infrastructure, and we have.” While this decision was applauded by domestic and international security organisations, Australia has an unbalanced risk based approach to cyber resilience. The lack of security in the cyber supply chain places Australia under threat from state-sponsored malicious networks.
The proliferation of electronic systems has increased the dependence of daily life on Integrated Circuits (IC). However, the integrity of ICs is under continued scrutiny from hardware-based security threats known as Hardware Trojan. Designed to be a backdoor into electronic devices, Hardware Trojan is an intentional malicious act to modify an electronic circuit or design. It has the ability to provide assistance to software based attacks and allows for modifications of functionality and specifications of a device, transmits sensitive information and implements a denial of service.
The risk of Hardware Trojans in ICs has increased in the past few decades due to the expansion of entities involved in the global supply chain. The manufacturing process of a technological product is composed of various elements from a broad global market. The current trend is for a distinct separation of design and manufacturing with the majority of fabrication facilities located in Asia. According to John Villasenor, this globalised market has “made it not only possible but inevitable that chips that have been intentionally and maliciously altered to contain hidden ‘Trojan’ circuitry will be inserted into the supply chain.” In order to ensure the cyber resilience of a product, it is critical to maintain tight control over the design and manufacturing of ICs. However, due to the costs associated with the design and manufacturing process, Australia’s military and commercial sectors depend exponentially on the globalisation of the electronics industry. Australia’s firm stance on Huawei is not reflected in measures taken to create an in-house process or ensure the credibility of commercial off the shelf electronic products.
This is particularly concerning as many of our products contain hardware produced in China, a country widely condemned for its cyber activities. According to a 2013 Mandiant Report, the Communist Party of China (CPC) has tasked the PLA to conduct systemic and widespread cyber espionage operations against governments and organisations across the world. Under the control of the General Staff 3rd Department, the PLA’s highly organised strategic cyber network consists of 130,000 personnel in twelve bureaus, three research institutes, and sixteen regional and functional bureaus. ABC reports that this network of organized and highly skilled nodes has lead to the hacking of the Departments of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Foreign Affairs and Defence for highly sensitive national security information. Furthermore, unconfirmed allegations have been made that blueprints for the new $630 million ASIO building were ascertained by Chinese officials in cyber espionage pursuits, providing the PLA with detailed mapping of communications networks and wiring diagrams. The concern for the government is the perception that Australia lacks the capability of maintaining a secure network. This may impact our relationship and intelligence sharing capacity with the two largest electronic intelligence-gathering operations in the world, the Government Communications Headquarters and the National Security Agency.
Hardware Trojans’ ability to circumvent security measures, inability to be removed through conventional software and lack of accountability has evolved it into a viable option for Chinese state-sponsored espionage pursuits. The enactment of the People's Republic of China National Security Law on July 1, 2015 and the CPC’s authoritarianism will allow China to impose themselves on organisations to provide information on ICs used in certain products and potentially force the use of Hardware Trojans. Due to the vulnerabilities of Lenovo hardware, the US, UK and Australia have prevented the use of its operating systems on the ‘secret’ and ‘top-secret’ networks. The Australian defence community uncovered modifications to Lenovo’s circuitry, which allowed remote access to the computers.
The discovery of such insecurities was possible after extensive and costly examinations, however such procedures are not available to the commercial sector. As approximately 90% of critical infrastructure is in private ownership, it is highly concerning for national security that Hardware Trojans can infiltrate such networks. Infiltration of critical infrastructure such as smart grids will greatly impact the functioning of society and the economy. The myriad of attacks on organisations and government departments this year foreshadows a future of increased cyber insecurity. While it is virtually impossible to assure the sanctity of electronic components in the globalised environment, Australian officials have been derelict in their duty to encourage greater scrutiny of hardware.